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Abstract
The international tax landscape is changing and it is chang-
ing fast. The political perception is that taxation of multina-
tional enterprises is not aligned with the ‘economic activity’
that produces their profits (i.e. not aligned with ‘value crea-
tion’). The perception links ‘value creation’ with ‘employees
and sales’.
In the BEPS Project of the OECD, the OECD attempts to
combat base erosion and profit shifting and to align taxation
with value creation. In this article, the authors discuss the
impact they expect BEPS to have on tax advisory and tax
planning. The focus goes to BEPS Actions 7, 8-10 and 13.
By maintaining the separate entity approach under BEPS for
the taxation of multinationals, has the OECD been forced to
‘stretch’ existing rules beyond their limits? Will the created
uncertainty lead to a shift from ‘aggressive tax planning’ by
multinationals to ‘aggressive tax collection’ by tax adminis-
trations? Will the role of tax advisory change from advising
on the lowest possible effective tax rate to a broader advice
including risk appetite and public expectations?
Keywords: BEPS, value creation, tax structuring, internation-
al taxation
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The international tax landscape is changing and it is
changing fast.1 In 2013, the OECD and G20 countries
adopted a 15-point Action Plan to address Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting (BEPS).2 On 5 October 2015, the
OECD published the Final BEPS package for reform of
* Paul Lankhorst, MSc LLM, is tax adviser at Loyens & Loeff. Harmen van
Dam, LLM, is tax partner at Loyens & Loeff.
1. See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), at 47.
2. See OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013).
the international tax system to tackle tax avoidance.3 In
2014, the Fiat, Apple and Starbucks cases showed that
the European Commission started to actively use state
aid rules to combat tax avoidance.4 On 30 August 2016
the European Commission concluded that Ireland gran-
ted Apple tax advantages amounting to EUR 13 billion.5
There is no doubt that the changing tax landscape influ-
ences tax advisory and tax planning. In this article we
discuss the impact of these changes on the role of tax
planning and tax advisory already existing and for the
future. By maintaining the separate entity approach
under BEPS for the taxation of multinationals, has the
OECD been forced to ‘stretch’ existing rules beyond
their limits? Will the created uncertainty lead to a shift
from ‘aggressive tax planning’ by multinationals to
3. See OECD, Explanatory Statement, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Project (2015) (hereinafter Explanatory Statement); OECD,
Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 – 2015
Final Report (2015) (hereinafter Action 1 Report); OECD, Neutralising
the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2 – 2015 Final
Report (2015) (hereinafter Action 2 Report); OECD, Designing Effective
Controlled Foreign Company Rules, Action 3 – 2015 Final Report
(2015) (hereinafter Action 3 Report); OECD, Limiting Base Erosion
Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4
– 2015 Final Report (2015) (hereinafter Action 4 Report); OECD, Coun-
tering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account
Transparency and Substance, Action 5 – 2015 Final Report (2015)
(hereinafter Action 5 Report); OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 – 2015 Final Report
(2015) (hereinafter Action 6 Report). OECD, Preventing the Artificial
Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 – 2015 Final
Report (2015) (hereinafter Action 7 Report). OECD, Aligning Transfer
Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 – 2015 Final
Reports (2015) (hereinafter Action 8-10 Reports). OECD (2015), Meas-
uring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11 – 2015 Final Report (2015)
(hereinafter Action 11 Report); OECD, Mandatory Disclosure Rules,
Action 12 – 2015 Final Report (2015) (hereinafter Action 12 Report);
OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country
Reporting, Action 13 – 2015 Final Report (2015) (hereinafter Action 13
Report); OECD, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effec-
tive, Action 14 – 2015 Final Report (2015) (hereinafter Action 14
Report); OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilat-
eral Tax Treaties, Action 15 – 2015 Final Report (2015) (hereinafter
Action 15 Report).
4. See e.g. Commission Decision of 17 October 2014, OJ C 369 SA.38373
(hereinafter Apple Case); Commission Decision of 21 October 2015, OJ
L 351 SA.38375 (hereinafter Fiat Case); Commission Decision of 6 Feb-
ruary 2015, OJ C 44 SA.38944 (hereinafter Amazon Case); Commission
Decision of 21 October 2015, OJ L 83 SA.38374 (hereinafter Starbuck
Case). For some analysis from a US perspective of these Commission
initiatives, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘The European Com-
mission’s recent state aid investigations of transfer pricing rulings’,
White Paper (2016).
5. European Commission, ‘State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to
Apple Worth up to €13 billion’ (2016), available at <http:// europa. eu/
rapid/ press -release_ IP -16 -2923_ en. htm> (last visited 20 June 2017).
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‘aggressive tax collection’ by tax administrations? Will
the role of tax advisory change from advising on the
lowest possible effective tax rate to a broader advice
including risk appetite and public expectations?
1.2 Research Question
In this article we answer the following question:
As tax practitioners, which impact do we expect from
BEPS on the role of tax structuring and tax advisory
of MNEs?
The political perception is that taxation of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) is not aligned with the ‘economic
activity’ that produces their profits (i.e. not aligned with
‘value creation).6 The perception links ‘value creation’
with ‘employees, assets, and sales’.7 BEPS Action 7
(Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent estab-
lishment status)8 and Actions 8-10 (Aligning transfer
pricing outcomes with value creation)9 attempt to
address this issue. Therefore, our focus goes to these
topics. Actions 8-10 are expected to have a big impact
because they change the fundamentals underlying the
arm’s length principle and have direct impact without
the need of further implementation.10 Although Action
7 requires implementation through tax treaties (or the
multilateral instrument),11 we expect a substantial
impact because it lowers the threshold of taxable pres-
ence in a country.12 In a globalising world where deci-
sion-making is not centralised in one location but spread
across the globe, many MNEs will be faced with (dis-
6. See e.g., Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying
down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the func-
tioning of the internal market, PB L 193, at 1; OECD, ‘Multilateral Con-
vention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting’ (2016), available at <www. oecd. org/ tax/
treaties/ multilateral -convention -to -implement -tax -treaty -related -
measures -to -prevent -BEPS. pdf> (last visited 20 June 2017), at 1. See
for a comparison Y. Brauner, ‘BEPS: An Interim Evaluation’, 6 World
Tax Journal 1, at 32 and 38 (2014). At 38: ‘… for transfer pricing, the
OECD has (unprecedently) produced what sounds like a principle: allo-
cation of tax base according to value creation.’
7. See for the discrepancy with regard to sales, e.g. BBC, ‘Starbucks Paid
Just £8.6m UK Tax in 14 Years’ (2012), available at <www. bbc. com/
news/ business -19967397> (last visited 20 June 2017). See for the value
creation with regard to employees, e.g. Action 8-10 Report (2015),
above n. 3; Dutch Decree of 15 January 2011, no. IFZ2010/457M, at 5.
Payroll and assets would represent the supply view of income produc-
tion, and corporate sales would represent the demand view of income
production. See for an analysis P.B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing
the State Corporate Tax Base’, in: C.E. McLure Jr. (ed.), The State Cor-
poration Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination
(1984), at 228-46. See for extensive analyses also M.F. de Wilde, Shar-
ing the Pie: Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market, diss. Erasmus
University Rotterdam (2015), available at <https:// papers. ssrn. com/
sol3/ papers. cfm ?abstract_ id= 2564181> (last visited 20 June 2017) (Ch.
6).
8. See Action 7 Report, above n. 3.
9. See Action 8-10 Reports, above n. 3.
10. Many countries directly apply the OECD Guidelines.
11. On 24 October 2016, the OECD published the text of the ‘Multilateral
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting’. The treaty is now open for ratification.
12. See for some analysis M. de Wilde, ‘Lowering the Permanent Establish-
ment Threshold via the anti-BEPS Convention: Much Ado About Noth-
ing?’, to be published in Intertax.
cussions about) the presence of permanent establish-
ments.13 Action 13 (Transfer pricing documentation
and country-by-country reporting)14 have the biggest
impact on tax structuring and tax advisory will give tax
administrations full insight into the transfer pricing
strategies of MNEs, forcing them to have defendable tax
structures and responding quickly to BEPS. We also
expect that Action 6 (Preventing the granting of treaty
benefits in inappropriate circumstances)15 will have a
big impact, since it denies treaty benefits in many situa-
tions where such benefits are currently available. Based
on our areas of expertise, we left this element open for
further research. The expected consequences specifical-
ly related to Action 6 require further investigation.
To answer the research question, we first discuss the
proposed measures of BEPS Actions 7, 8-10 and 13 and
the consequences we expect these measures to have on
tax advisory and tax structuring. We then discuss three
issues of international corporate taxation that BEPS
does not address.
2 Expected consequences of
BEPS
2.1 Introduction
In this section we explain which consequences we
expect from the outcomes of the implementation of the
BEPS in the international corporation tax systems of
countries. Before being able to do so, it is necessary to
briefly describe the proposed measures of BEPS, which
we expect to have the biggest impact. As described in
Section 1.2, this concerns Actions 8-10, Action 7 and
Action 13. For these Actions, we will first describe the
most important observations and we will then describe
the consequences we expect from these observations.
2.2 Actions 8-10
2.2.1 Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value
Creation
The arm’s length principle is used by countries as the
cornerstone of transfer pricing rules.16 The OECD pro-
vides guidance on the interpretation of the arm’s length
principle in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
(OECD Guidelines).17 In its effort to combat BEPS, the
OECD was of the view that the guidance on the arm’s
length principle needed to be clarified and strengthened.18
Actions 8-10 give the ‘clarification’ proposed by the
13. Ibid.
14. See Action 13 Report, above n. 3.
15. See Action 6 Report, above n. 3.
16. The arm’s length standard can be found in the equivalents of Art. 9
OECD Model Tax Convention in the double tax conventions of coun-
tries.
17. See OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises and Tax Administrations (2010), revised in: OECD (2015) Action
8-10 Reports, above n. 3.
18. See Action 8-10 Reports, above n. 3, at 9-10.
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OECD and focuses on intangibles, risks and re-charac-
terisation of transactions.19
2.2.2 Most Important Observations in Relation to Actions
8-10
We deem the following observations to be the most
important conclusions of Actions 8-10:
1. Actions 8-10 stretch the arm’s length principle
beyond its boundaries by putting economic concepts
of what third parties should do according to econom-
ic theories above what third parties actually do;
2. Actions 8-10 imply that contracts are irrelevant,
which stretches arm’s length principle to the extent
that it almost resembles a formulary apportionment
based on functionality;
3. Actions 8-10 use vague concepts to draw conclusions.
Below we explain where Actions 8-10 implicitly or
explicitly draw these conclusions. Subsequently we will
explain which consequences this has on the tax planning
of MNEs.
• Ad 1. Actions 8-10 stretch the arm’s length
principle by putting economic concepts of what
third parties should do according to economic
theories above what third parties actually do
Although a more fundamental solution to tackle BEPS
is in our view preferred (see Section 3), the OECD
intends to maintain the arm’s length principle as corner-
stone for transfer pricing rules.20 Nonetheless, the
OECD acknowledges that under existing interpretations
of the arm’s length principle, it may provide opportuni-
ties for base erosion and profit shifting.21 Actions 8-10
are presented as a clarification of how the arm’s length
principle should be interpreted.22 But Actions 8-10 go
further than that. As we will demonstrate below, the
‘clarification’ of the arm’s length principle given by the
OECD stretches the arm’s length principle beyond its
historic meaning by shifting from looking at what inde-
pendent entities actually do to what independent enti-
ties should do according to economic theory.
To demonstrate this, we go back to the basics of the
arm’s length principle and look at the wording of Article
9(1) of the OECD Model Convention (OECD Model):
Where a) an enterprise of a Contracting State partici-
pates directly or indirectly in the management, con-
trol or capital of an enterprise of the other Contract-
ing State, or b) the same persons participate directly
or indirectly in the management, control or capital of
19. Ibid.
20. See OECD, ‘BEPS – Frequently Asked Questions’, available at <www.
oecd. org/ ctp/ beps -frequentlyaskedquestions. htm#Action8 ?> (last vis-
ited at 20 June 2017) at no. 54.
21. See Ibid. at no. 55 and 108. See also for a short analysis of the weak-
nesses and strengths of the arm’s length principle: O. Treidler, ‘The
Arm’s Length Principle in the Times of BEPS’ (2016), Discussion Paper,
available at <DOI: 10. 13140/ RG. 2. 1. 1937. 1286> (last visited 20 June
2017), at 3-4.
22. See Action 8-10 Reports, above n. 3. The OECD’s Action Reports on
transfer pricing have been incorporated in the OECD’s Transfer Pricing
by decision of the OECD Council on 23 May 2016.
an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise
of the other Contracting State, and in either case con-
ditions are made or imposed between the two enter-
prises in their commercial or financial relations which
differ from those which would be made between indepen-
dent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for
those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterpri-
ses, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so
accrued, may be included in the profits of that enter-
prise and taxed accordingly. (emphasis added; HvD
and PL)
It follows from the wording of Article 9(1) that a com-
parison should be drawn with the conditions made or
imposed between independent enterprises. As such, one
complies with the arm’s length principle if one acts as
independent enterprises also do. Actions 8-10 deviate
from this basic principle of the arm’s length principle.
Below we give two examples.
Example 1. Requirement to demonstrate completely
rational behaviour
In its guidance on re-characterisation of transactions,
Actions 8-10 state that ‘The transaction […] may be dis-
regarded […] where the arrangements made in relation
to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from
those which would have been adopted by independent
enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in
comparable circumstances.’23 It follows from this state-
ment that the OECD does not simply require that rela-
ted companies act in line with arrangements that would
have been adopted by independent enterprises, but that
it adds the criterion of commercial rationality to the
arm’s length principle: the OECD intends to look at
what independent enterprise would do if they would act
in a commercially rational manner.
What independent enterprises would do if they acted in
a commercially rational manner differs from what inde-
pendent enterprises actually do. Nobel Prize winner
Daniel Kahneman has shown that, in reality, the
assumption of rational economic decision-making is
false.24 The examples given by Kahneman show that
irrational decision-making is very common. A group of
200 respondents were asked the following:
Imagine that you have decided to see a play and paid
the admission price of $ 10 per ticket. As you enter
the theatre, you discover that you have lost the ticket.
Would you pay $ 10 for another ticket?
46% of the respondents answered with yes, 54% with
no. Then a group of 183 respondents were asked the fol-
lowing:
Imagine that you have decided to see a play and paid
the admission price of $ 10 per ticket. As you enter
23. See OECD (2015), above n. 17, at 39-40.
24. See D. Kahneman, ‘New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption’,
150, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics no. 1 (1994) at
18-36.
62
ELR August 2017 | No. 1 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000083
the theatre, you discover that you have lost a $ 10 bill.
Would you pay $ 10 for a ticket to the play?
88% of the respondents answered with yes, 12% with
no. Although the outcome of both scenarios is identical,
the respondents gave different answers. As follows from
this example and many other examples given by Kahne-
man, human behaviour is subject to limited rationality.25
It does therefore not fit within the arm’s length princi-
ple to require full rationality in intragroup transactions
where third party transactions are characterised by limi-
ted rationality.
Example 2. Requirement to analyse all options realisti-
cally available
Another topic where Actions 8-10 replace actual behav-
iour of independent enterprises with economic concepts
of what independent enterprises should do according to
economic theory is the requirement to always choose the
‘best option realistically available’. Actions 8-10 state
that
Independent enterprises, when evaluating the terms
of a potential transaction, will compare the transac-
tion to the other options realistically available to
them, and they will only enter into the transaction if
they see no alternative that offers a clearly more
attractive opportunity to meet their commercial
objectives.26
In reality, people will more readily choose the option
that is ‘good enough’ rather than the best option out of
those available.27 Human beings make their economic
decisions mainly on the basis of heuristics (rules of
thumb) and not on the basis of well-considered choices
between all of the options available. By requiring to
choose the best option out of all options realistically
available, the OECD deviates from actual human behav-
iour.
In conclusion, human behaviour is marked by limited
rationality and opportunism. It would therefore be inap-
propriate to impose economic concepts on transactions
between associated enterprises where (the board mem-
bers of) independent enterprises do not follow these
economic concepts. The arm’s length principle’s pur-
pose is to allocate the right to tax the profits that an
MNE actually makes and not to enable tax authorities to
tax profits that an associated enterprise could have made
if it behaved according to certain prescriptive economic
theories.28
25. D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), at 368-9.
26. See Action 8-10 Reports, above n. 3, at 16.
27. As demonstrated by H. Simon, see e.g. G. Fellner, W. Güth & E. Martin,
‘Satisficing or Optimizing? An Experimental Study’, Discussion Paper on
Strategic Interaction (2006); T. Hindle, Guide to Management Ideas
and Gurus (2008).
28. For more information, see M.A. de Lange, R. Hafkenscheid & P. Lank-
horst, ‘(Non-)Recognition of Transactions between Associated Enterpri-
ses: on Behaving in a Commercially Rational Manner, Decision-Making
Traps and BEPS’, 22 International Transfer Pricing Journal no. 2 (2015).
• Ad 2. OECD implies that contractual
arrangements are irrelevant, which stretches arm’s
length principle to the extent that it almost
resembles a formulary apportionment based on
functionality
Under the arm’s length principle, transactions are
priced taking into account functions performed, assets
owned and risks assumed.29 Actions 8-10 give an inter-
esting interpretation of how to allocate risks and assets.
With regard to risks assumed, Actions 8-10 state that
risks contractually assumed by a party that cannot in
fact exercise meaningful and specifically defined control
over the risks, or does not have the financial capacity to
assume the risks, will be allocated to the party that does
exercise such control and does have the financial capaci-
ty to assume the risks.30
The OECD developed a step plan to determine to
which entity it deems to assume the risks for the pur-
pose of a transfer pricing analysis. This is not necessari-
ly the entity that contractually incurs the risks. On the
contrary, under BEPS 8-10 contractual arrangements
seem to have become irrelevant. The OECD developed
the following step plan to allocate risks for the purpose
of a transfer pricing analysis:31
1. Identify economically significant risks with specif-
icity;
2. Determine how the risks are contractually
assumed by the enterprises under the terms of the
transaction;
3. Determine through a functional analysis how the
associated enterprises that are parties to the trans-
action operate in relation to assumption and man-
agement of the specific, economically significant
risks, and in particular which enterprise or enter-
prises perform control functions and risk mitiga-
tion functions, which enterprise or enterprises
encounter upside or downside consequences of
risk outcomes, and which enterprise or enterprises
have the financial capacity to assume the risk;
4. Steps 2-3 will have identified information relating
to the assumption and management of risks in the
controlled transaction. The next step is to inter-
pret the information and determine whether the
contractual assumption of risk is consistent with
the conduct of the associated enterprises and other
facts of the case by analysing (i) whether the asso-
ciated enterprises follow the contractual terms
[…]; and (ii) whether the party assuming risk, as
analysed under (i), exercises control over the risk
and has the financial capacity to assume the risk
5. Where the party assuming risk under steps 1-4(i)
does not control the risk or does not have the
financial capacity to assume the risk, apply the
guidance on allocating risk. The guidance on allo-
cating risk refers to functions (see below). In other
words: step 3 prevails over step 2.
29. OECD (2010), above n. 17, at 43.
30. See OECD (2010), above n. 17, at 243-46.
31. OECD (2015), above n. 17, at 22.
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6. The actual transaction as accurately delineated by
considering the evidence of all the economically
relevant characteristics of the transaction […],
should then be priced taking into account the
financial and other consequences of risk assump-
tion, as appropriately allocated, and appropriately
compensating risk management functions.
The step plan does not explicitly state that contractual
arrangements are irrelevant: Step 2 states that the con-
tractual arrangements should be reviewed as part of the
analysis. That contracts are considered irrelevant fol-
lows from the remainder of the step plan. If step 2 is not
consistent with step 3, step 3 prevails. As such, step 3
always determines allocation of risk. Under step 3, there
are three elements that determine risk allocation: (i) who
performs and controls functions in relation to the risk,
(ii) who encounters the upsides and downsides of the
risk and (iii) who has the financial capability to assume
the risk. The first element clearly ignores contractual
arrangements. At first sight, the second and third ele-
ment seem to depend on contractual arrangements. A
closer look at the guidance of Actions 8-10 shows that
this is only an illusion.
Hafkenscheid has demonstrated that the questions of
who encounters the upsides and downsides of the risk
and who has the financial capability to assume the risk,
are linked to functionality in Actions 8-10.32 In summa-
ry, this follows from paragraphs 1.85 and 1.103 of
Actions 8-10. Paragraph 1.85 together with 1.103 con-
cludes that a company (Company A) that is the legal
owner of an asset, but does lack capability to decide on
whether to invest in the particular asset, and whether
and how to protect its investment including whether to
dispose of the asset, is only entitled to a risk-free return
on its investment:
Company A does not have control over the economi-
cally significant risks associated with the investment
in and exploitation of the asset, and those risks should
be aligned with control of those risks by Companies B
and C. The functional contribution of Company A is
limited to providing financing for an amount equat-
ing to the cost of the asset that enables the asset to be
created and exploited by Companies B and C. How-
ever, the functional analysis also provides evidence
that Company A has no capability and authority to
control the risk of investing in a financial asset. Com-
pany A does not have the capability to make decisions
to take on or decline the financing opportunity, or the
capability to make decisions on whether and how to
respond to the risks associated with the financing
opportunity. Company A does not perform functions
to evaluate the financing opportunity, does not con-
sider the appropriate risk premium and other issues
to determine the appropriate pricing of the financing
opportunity, and does not evaluate the appropriate
32. See R.P.F.M. Hafkenscheid, ‘Het BEPS-rapport over risicoallocatie: niet
zo functioneel’, WFR 2016/99.
protection of its financial investment. […] Company
A would not be entitled to any more than a risk-free
return as an appropriate measure of the profits it is
entitled to retain, since it lacks the capability to con-
trol the risk associated with investing in a riskier
financial asset. The risk will be allocated to the enter-
prise which has control and the financial capacity to
assume the risk associated with the financial asset.
The OECD uses a similar reasoning with regard to
ownership of intangible assets. Paragraph 6.35 of the
OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines states that legal
rights and contractual arrangements form the starting
point for any transfer pricing analysis involving intangi-
bles.33 One would again expect that this means that con-
tractual arrangements are considered relevant. However,
Actions 8-10 continue by stating that ‘while determin-
ing legal ownership and contractual arrangements is an
important first step in the analysis, these determinations
are separate and distinct from the question of remunera-
tion under the arm’s length principle’.34 The contractual
right to exploit an intangible does not – according to the
OECD – give any right to retain returns on the intangi-
ble. The legal owner of intangibles is only entitled to all
returns derived from the exploitation of the intangibles,
if it performs all the functions related to the develop-
ment, enhancement, maintenance, protection and
exploitation (DEMPE) of the intangibles.35 If the legal
owner neither controls nor performs these so-called
DEMPE functions, the legal owner would not be enti-
tled to any ongoing benefit attributable to the out-
sourced functions. The OECD ignores that in third par-
ty transactions, the owner of an asset is often entitled to
the returns on that asset, even without having the afore-
mentioned capabilities. In third party transactions, the
return depends on the scarcity of the asset.
As an example, one can think of the owner of capital
that hires an asset manager to invest its capital. The
asset manager has the capability to decide on whether to
invest in a particular asset, and whether to dispose of the
asset. Would the owner of the asset be merely entitled to
a risk free return on its capital, while the asset manager
retains all remaining results?
Another example concerns the image rights of famous
football players. One would not expect the football play-
er to perform the functions related to the exploitation of
the rights itself, but to hire an agent to perform these
functions on a commission basis.
From the observations above, it can be concluded that
under BEPS Actions 8-10, a functional analysis taking
into account functions performed, assets used and risks
assumed still forms the basis of a transfer pricing analy-
sis. However, the assumption of risks and the ownership
of assets follows the functions performed in relation to
the risks and assets. As a consequence, with Actions
8-10 the OECD reduced the traditional functional anal-
33. OECD (2015), above n. 17, at 75.
34. Ibid., at 76.
35. Ibid., at 78.
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ysis from an analysis of functions, assets and risks, to
merely an analysis of functions.
By focusing the functional analysis only on functions
performed, the OECD does not follow economic princi-
ples of how profits are divided between factors contri-
buting to the profit. Economics is the study of how peo-
ple choose to allocate their scarce resources.36 It is there-
fore remarkable that the OECD guidance does not take
into account the scarcity of the various factors contribu-
ting to profit when stating that most emphasis is to be
put on functions. Actions 8-10 ignore the basic princi-
ples of economics by only allocating value to functions
instead of looking at the scarcity of all production fac-
tors (see also Section 3.1).37
All in all, while pretending to maintain the arm’s length
principle as leading principle for transfer pricing, the
OECD stretches the interpretation of the arm’s length
principle to the extent that it almost resembles a formu-
lary apportionment based on functionality.
That the OECD implies that contracts are irrelevant in
a functional analysis, does not mean that the importance
of concluding intercompany agreements decreases. On
the contrary, as we will explain in Section 2.2.3, con-
cluding intercompany agreements has become even
more important than before.
• Ad 3. The OECD uses vague concepts to draw
conclusions
Examples of vague concepts
Actions 8-10 use vague concepts to explain how in the
view of the OECD the arm’s length principle should be
interpreted.
An important example is the primacy of the ‘actual con-
duct’ of the parties in a transaction over the contractual
relationship as proposed in paragraph 1.88.38 In prac-
tice, the actual conduct of people deviates substantially
from what they should be doing based on, for example,
job descriptions and management reporting lines. In
practice, whom of the employees in an MNE makes the
actual decisions is driven by various circumstances, such
as personal impact or the informal power of a staff
member, which person of the staff has invented an idea,
who has the capacity, capability, energy and spirit to put
that idea into practice. The result thereof is that taking
the ‘actual conduct’ of parties as starting point (i) makes
it practically impossible to draw conclusions on who is
doing what as this differs all the time, and (ii) potential-
ly leads to random outcomes and thus windfall profit
allocations. In many situations it will be impossible to
‘trace’ all steps in the invention of a successful idea, let
alone how the decisions about implementing an idea are
actually made. To avoid the impracticalities of looking
at actual conduct of people, people invented the use of
contracts as a means of establishing relations between
parties. Deviating from such contractual relations and
36. M.L. Katz and H.S. Rosen, Microeconomics (1998), at 2.
37. In addition to looking at this ‘supply side’ of profit generation, the
demand side (revenue) should be considered. See for a comparison
Musgrave, above n. 7, at 228-46.
38. OECD (2015), above n. 17, at 31-2.
requiring that profit be allocated based on actual con-
duct creates uncertainty and the risk of diverging con-
clusions on what the ‘actual conduct’ of parties has
been.
Another example is the guidance that is given regarding
synergy benefits. Actions 8-10 state that ‘if important
group synergies exist and can be attributed to deliberate
concerted group actions, the benefits of such synergies
should generally be shared by members of the group in
proportion to their contribution to the creation of the
synergy.’ (emphasis added)39 The notion of ‘deliberate
concerted group actions’ is sufficiently vague to create
discussions on whether a certain synergy benefit is
caused by such deliberate concerted group action. For
example, are synergy benefits derived from centralising
production in one plant deliberate concerted group
actions? The benefit that a group member obtains by
being able to borrow at more favourable conditions by
reason of having a credit rating that is higher than it
would be if it was unaffiliated, is apparently not consid-
ered to be attributable to deliberate concerted actions:
following the OECD Guidelines such a benefit is alloca-
ted to the group member attracting the financing and is
not shared between the members of the group contribu-
ting to the higher credit rating.40 But also in cases
whether it is clear that there have been deliberate con-
certed group actions, Actions 8-10 only indicate that the
synergies created by this actions should ‘generally be
shared among members of the group’. This implies that
there are exceptions to the main rule. Our personal
experience as tax practitioners is that the extraordinary
cases are the main source of discussions with tax author-
ities, but no guidance is provided in Actions 8-10 on
cases that deviate from what ‘generally’ happens.
Deviating interpretation by different countries
The goals that different OECD countries want to realise
with BEPS are not aligned. Especially the goals of the
US and the European Union seem to deviate. In an
interview with BNA, the US Deputy Assistant Treas-
ury Secretary for International Tax Policy Robert Stack
indicates that some countries were concerned that the
rules on risk, capital and control were previously not
clear, and therefore felt the need to re-characterise
transactions, but that the US managed to establish that
the rules on re-characterisation have not materially
changed. Mr Stack indicates that it is still the intention
of the US that contracts are respected: ‘we spend a lot of
time trying to build up the notion that if there is a con-
tract and tax authorities are able to see that parties act in
accordance with the contract, they respect the real
deal’.41 This differs from the conclusion that Actions
8-10 intend to focus on functions, not on contracts.
39. Ibid., at 48.
40. OECD (2010), above n. 17, at 7.13.
41. Bloomberg BNA, ‘Robert Stack Discusses U.S. Participation in Interna-
tional Tax Fora and U.S. Tax Reform’, available at <https:// www. bna.
com/ robert -stack -deputy -m17179936316/ > (last visited 25 June 2017).
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Interpretation differences with non-OECD countries
will remain in place.42 An important example is the
application of the arm’s length principle to ‘location
benefits’. Non-OECD countries such as China (even
though participating in BEPS) are known to have devi-
ating views on location benefits from most OECD coun-
tries.43 China applies a broad concept of location bene-
fits, which includes for example the general preference
of Chinese consumers for foreign automotive brands.44
China may take the position that the additional sales
realised as a result of this preference are taxable in Chi-
na, while OECD countries may claim that these addi-
tional profits originate from the ownership of the brand
name.45 While the OECD countries in this example
focus at the ‘supply side’ of profit generation, China
focusses more on the demand side (revenue).46
2.2.3 Consequences
We expect that stretching the arm’s length principle,
ignoring contracts and using vague concepts has conse-
quences for (i) tax structuring, and (ii) tax advisory.
• Ad (i) Tax structuring
More disputes with tax authorities
Provoked by the ambiguous guidance on how associated
enterprises should price their transactions in order to
comply with the arm’s length principle and feeling sup-
ported by public opinion, some tax authorities will be
tempted to argue that more profits should be allocated
to them.47 Not being able to enforce or rely on unambig-
uous and consistent guidance, and keeping in mind the
deviation of the OECD Guidelines from actual behav-
iour of independent enterprises, many uncertainties will
arise for MNEs.
Shift of functions away from high-tax countries
We expect that MNEs will be reluctant to allocate large
profits to empty cash boxes (including IP companies),
knowing that they will be confronted with disputes with
tax authorities feeling supported by the OECD guid-
ance. Refrained from using empty cash boxes, MNEs
would be tempted to – notwithstanding the lack of busi-
ness needs – centralise functions (potentially to tax
friendly locations) to reduce the uncertainty of how dif-
ferent countries will interpret the arm’s length princi-
ple. As discussed in Section 3.2, corporation tax is
already considered to be among the most distorting tax-
es. Triggering MNEs to ‘artificially’ centralise functions
42. There are several differences between the approach of the United
Nations and the OECD, see United Nations, Practical Manual on Trans-
fer Pricing for Developing Countries (2013), chapter 10; OECD (2015),
above n. 3.
43. See United Nations, above n. 42, at 376-79, 387-88.
44. Ibid., at 377.
45. M.A. de Lange and P.W.H. Lankhorst, ‘The Impact of Location Advan-
tages on the Transfer Pricing of Multinationals: On the Chinese Love for
European Designer Handbags and Lower Production Costs in India’, 21
International Transfer Pricing Journal 4 (2014).
46. See Musgrave, above n. 7.
47. See for a comparison in view of PE profit attribution in response to the
lowering of PE thresholds with a view to Action 7; De Wilde, above n.
12, at Sec. 4.3.
in tax friendly locations might hamper business and
trigger relocation of jobs, harming the economy.
Reduced value of the OECD Guidelines
The interpretation of Actions 8-10 deviates from eco-
nomic reality and uses vague concepts such as ‘actual
conduct’. Stretching the arm’s length principle beyond
its limits in this way diminishes the value the OECD
guidelines traditionally have had in the practical appli-
cation of the arm’s length principle. Tax courts in vari-
ous jurisdictions will perceive the ambiguous guidance
that does not conform to economic reality as a less relia-
ble source of information for resolving tax disputes.
This effect is strengthened by the limited democratic
foundation of the OECD Guidelines. In many coun-
tries, the OECD Guidelines are merely recommenda-
tions of an intergovernmental organisation.48
New tax planning opportunities
The diminishing authority will lead to differences in
interpretation and application of the arm’s length prin-
ciple between jurisdictions, leading to more instead of
less opportunities to exploit differences between coun-
tries. Tax courts in some countries may fully apply the
new OECD Guidance, while tax courts in other coun-
tries may maintain a more strict interpretation of the
arm’s length principle. This inevitably creates dispari-
ties in the interpretation of the arm’s length principle,
causing undesirable tax planning opportunities for
MNEs.
Different goals and interpretations by different coun-
tries create mismatches in the interpretation of the arm’s
length principle. New tax planning opportunities arise
on which no common knowledge has yet been devel-
oped.
• Ad (ii) Tax advisory
Advice more intragroup agreements
The more opportunistic behaviour of tax authorities will
lead to more disputes between MNEs and tax authori-
ties. In addition, not being able to rely on unambiguous
and consistent guidance will force MNEs to thoroughly
document the reasons for all their transactions and the
arguments why the price of the transaction is arm’s
length to be prepared for potential discussions.
Although in the reasoning of Actions 8-10 contracts are
irrelevant for the determination of an arm’s length
remuneration, MNEs will be impelled to conclude
intragroup contracts to formally document and leave no
doubt about the roles and responsibilities of each party
in a transaction. This will be helpful in defending the
roles and responsibilities of the parties in court against
claims that the roles and responsibilities were different
based on actual conduct.
Broader advisory role towards taxpayers
Our personal expectation as tax practitioners is that tax
advisers will be more involved in advising clients on
48. See also R. Luja, ‘Fiscale rulings en staatssteun’, Nederlands Juristen-
blad 14 (2015), at 870.
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conscious decision-making and awareness when it comes
to tax planning. We refer to Section 3.3 for guidance on
creating awareness of MNEs attitude towards tax plan-
ning.
More critical role towards positions taken by tax author-
ities
As stated above, some tax authorities will be tempted to
argue that more profits should be allocated to them pro-
voked by the ambiguous guidance on how associated
enterprises should price their transactions. In our per-
sonal observations as tax practitioners, the new OECD
guidance has already been accepted by some advisers as
the only correct interpretation of the arm’s length prin-
ciple. In our view, it is the role of the tax adviser to criti-
cally analyse the positions taken by tax authorities and
not simply accept positions taken by tax authorities (also
ex ante) as the ‘truth’.
2.3 BEPS Action 7
2.3.1 Lowering the Threshold for Taxable Presence
Under Article 7 of the OECD Model Convention, busi-
ness profits of foreign enterprises are only taxable in a
country if the foreign enterprise has a PE in that coun-
try to which the profit is attributable. Article 5 of the
OECD Model Convention contains a definition of per-
manent establishment. Action 7 attempts to prevent the
artificial avoidance of permanent establishments by
changing this definition in the Model Convention.
Currently, Article 5(5) OECD Model Convention states
that where a person habitually uses the authority in a
contracting state to conclude contracts in the name of a
foreign enterprise, that foreign enterprise shall be
deemed to have a PE in that state. As such, Article 5(5)
depends on the formal conclusion of contracts in the
name of the foreign enterprise. By arranging that the
commissionaire does not have such an authority, the
foreign enterprise can avoid having taxable presence in
the other country.
Action 7 proposes to change the definition of permanent
establishment in three areas: commissionaire arrange-
ment, the exception for auxiliary activities and splitting
up contracts to avoid PE status.49 We expect most
impact from the proposals regarding commissionaire
arrangements. Action 7 proposes to lower the threshold
of a permanent establishment by extending the defini-
tion of the deemed permanent establishment to persons
habitually concluding contracts that are to be performed
by the enterprise, or habitually playing the principal role
leading to the conclusion of such contracts which are
routinely concluded without material modification by
the enterprise.
The OECD notes that common tax avoidance strategies
use commissionaire arrangements to shift profits out of
the country where the sales take place, without a sub-
stantive change in the functions performed in that coun-
try (but with a change of risks reducing the arm’s length
49. See Action 7 Report, above n. 3, at 9-11.
remuneration). In line with Actions 8-10,50 Action 7
thus attempts to align profit allocation with value crea-
tion (whereby value creation is interpreted as people
functions).51 Unlike Actions 8-10, Action 7 does not
ignore contractual allocation of risk, but creates taxable
presence of the entity that contractually assumes the risk
in the country where the sales are made.52
Based on Action 7 a PE will be deemed to exist where an
agent plays an important role in the conclusion of con-
tracts between the principal and the customers.
2.3.2 Most Important Observations in Relation to
Action 7
If and when implemented, MNEs using commissionaire
arrangements may be confronted with PEs of their prin-
cipal company in the commissionaire states. Although
Action 7 uses commissionaire arrangements as a primary
example, we expect that it will have a broader impact
than only commissionaire structures. In each situation
where decisions that bind legal entities, or decisions that
play an important role in binding legal entities, are made
outside of the country of residence of a legal entity, the
extended PE definition may trigger discussions about
the presence of a PE.
Decisions that bind legal entities, or decisions that play
an important role in binding legal entities, were histori-
cally often made by the local management of the respec-
tive legal entity. For efficiency reasons, there is trend
that not all relevant capabilities to make business deci-
sions are present in each separate affiliate (see Section
3.1). Instead, legal entities will use capabilities available
elsewhere in the group to assist in decision-making.
This process is facilitated by a globalising world that
offers flexibility in where people perform their func-
tions. As a result, we more and more see that involve-
ment in decision-making that binds a legal entity is
spread across various countries. Having decision-mak-
ing taking place in various countries leads to an
increased risk of discussions on the presence of PEs, an
increased risk of discussions on the attribution of profits
to permanent establishments, and the potential obliga-
tion to file (multiple) tax returns in the PE countries.
2.3.3 Consequences
• Tax structuring
In our practice we observe that Action 7 is creating sub-
stantial uncertainties for MNEs. We see a trend that
being ‘in control’ is becoming more important for
MNEs. Certainty is often considered more important
than low taxation. The question arises how MNEs will
manage the uncertainties created by Action 7.
Centralised decision-making in the country where a
legal entity is located would decrease the risk created by
Action 7. However, this would not be in line with the
50. See Action 8-10 Reports, above n. 3.
51. See OECD, ‘Revised discussion draft. BEPS Action 7: Preventing the
Artificial Avoidance of PE Status’ (2015), available at <www. oecd. org/
ctp/ treaties/ revised -discussion -draft -beps -action -7 -pe -status. pdf> (last
visited at 20 June 2017), at 37.
52. See De Wilde, above n. 12, at Sec. 4.3.
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business-driven development of having relevant capabil-
ities for decision-making spread across various locations.
Another more likely scenario is that MNEs will avoid
discussions with tax authorities by proactively claiming
taxable presence in a country. We expect that MNEs
will prefer to work with one legal entity with permanent
establishments in each country where it formerly oper-
ated through a legal entity. This reduces discussions
about the presence of PEs of various legal entities, and
reduces the taxable presence in each country to one legal
entity. As tax practitioners, we also see MNEs consider-
ing filing ‘zero profit PE filings’ in various countries to
reduce the risk of fines.
This effect is strengthened when combined with
Actions 8-10. Historically, a benefit of using a legal enti-
ty instead of a permanent establishment was that for the
allocation of profits to a legal entity, the functional anal-
ysis takes into account functions performed, assets used
and risks assumed. This allows MNEs to influence prof-
it allocation through (contractual) allocation of assets
and risks. For the profit allocation to PEs, the OECD
states that there is no single part of the enterprise that
legally owns assets and assumes risk.53 As a solution,
assets and risks are allocated to that part of the enter-
prise that performs the significant people functions related
to the asset/risk.54 As explained in Section 2.2.1,
Actions 8-10 claim that also for legal entities, contrac-
tual relationships should be considered in view of func-
tions performed. The difference between profit alloca-
tion to legal entities and that to PEs has therefore – at
least according to the OECD – substantially been
reduced. This contributes to the expected tendency of
moving towards PE structures.
• Tax advisory
For tax advisers we expect an important role in assisting
MNEs to be in control. In our observations as tax prac-
titioners, to be in control in an uncertain tax environ-
ment does not necessarily require certainty on all tax
positions taken, but does require full insight and trans-
parent communication about the risks involved for the
53. OECD, Report on the attribution of profits to permanent establish-
ments (2010), available at <www. oecd. org/ ctp/ transfer -pricing/
45689524. pdf> (last visited 20 June 2017), at 14.
54. Lacking agreements between a head office and a PE, only functions
remain. We would like to note that this may not be true for entities
with legal personality that qualify as a PE because they are treated as
transparent entities for tax purposes.
positions taken and the alternatives, and documented
reasons for accepting the risks. We refer to Section 3.3
for guidance on creating awareness of MNEs’ attitude
towards tax planning.
2.4 BEPS Action 13
2.4.1 New Documentation Requirements
Another part of the BEPS Action Plan we expect to
have a big impact is Action 13.55 Action 13 contains a
revised Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines dealing
with transfer pricing documentation.56 The revised
guidance requires MNEs to provide tax authorities with
high-level information regarding their global business
operations and transfer pricing policies in a Master File.
In addition, it requires that detailed transactional trans-
fer pricing documentation is provided in a Local File
specific to each country, identifying material-related
party transactions, the amounts involved in those trans-
actions and the company’s analysis of the transfer pric-
ing determinations they have made with regard to those
transactions. Very large MNEs are further required to
file a Country-by-Country Report that will provide for
each tax jurisdiction in which they do business the
amount of revenue, profit before income tax, income tax
paid and accrued, number of employees, stated capital,
retained earnings and tangible assets.57
The OECD distinguishes three objectives of the new
transfer pricing documentation:58
1. To ensure taxpayers give appropriate consideration
to transfer pricing requirements.
2. To provide tax administrations with the information
needed to conduct a transfer pricing assessment.
3. To provide tax administrations with useful informa-
tion to employ in conducting an audit of the transfer
pricing practices of taxpayers.
These objectives form a logical part of the OECDs
efforts to combat BEPS. Tax authorities need informa-
tion on the transfer pricing system of an MNE to identi-
55. See Action 13 Report, above n. 3. Within the EU the outcomes of
Action 13 have been implemented on an EU wide basis by means of
amending the Administrative Cooperation Directive; see Council Direc-
tive (EU) 2016/881 of 25 May 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU
as regards mandatory, automatic exchange of information in the field of
taxation, OJ L 146.
56. See Action 13 Report, above n. 3, at 11-69.
57. See Action 13 Report, above n. 3, at 9.
58. Ibid., at 12-4.
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fy where the MNE may have an incentive to optimise
the transfer prices used.59
2.4.2 Most Important Observations in Relation to
Action 13
Action 13 puts a substantial administrative burden on
MNEs.60 In our view, the information that needs to be
included in the Master File and Country-by-Country
report is in principle available within each MNE.61 For
example, the Master File should include a description of
the MNE’s important drivers of business profits, the
supply chain of the five largest products by turnover
and how the MNE is financed.62 The same applies to
the Country-by-Country report, which requires mainly
financial input such as revenues, income tax paid and
stated capital. To accommodate the complaints of
MNEs, the documentation obligations have built in a
certain flexibility for taxpayers to choose which infor-
mation will be included in the documentation. For
example, the Country-by-Country report can be based
on data from consolidation reporting packages, statutory
financial statements, regulatory financial statements or
internal management accounts, as long as the choice is
made consistently. The guidance on the Master File
states that taxpayers should use prudent business judge-
ment in determining the appropriate level of detail for
the information supplied, which also gives certain free-
dom to MNEs.
Although the OECD made some efforts to reduce the
administrative burden for MNEs,63 the administrative
burden could in our view have been reduced more by
better guidance.
• FTEs
In the Country-by-Country report, there are ambiguous
terms that make the completion of the report difficult.
There are also requirements to include information that
is not available. For example, an MNE should report
the total number of employees on a full-time basis.
There are MNEs whose accounting software only show
the total number of employees, not the full-time equiva-
lent. FTE is equal to (a) the number of total scheduled
person hours divided by (b) the number of hours per
week of a full-time employee. The number of hours per
week of a full-time employee differs between countries
(e.g. India 48 hours, the Netherlands 40 hours). No fur-
ther guidance is provided on how to interpret the term
FTE.
• Joint Ventures
More practical problems arise where the taxpayer is a
joint venture that is included in the consolidation of one
59. Ibid., at 12.
60. See e.g. A.M. Parker, ‘BEPS ‘Master File’ Requirements Raising Con-
cern’ (2016), available at <www. bna. com/ beps -master -file -m57982059
329/ > (last visited 20 June 2016).
61. This might be different for the Local File where a benchmark seems to
be required for each material controlled transaction.
62. See Action 13 Report, above n. 3, at 25.
63. Ibid., at 38 for an example.
of the joint venture partners.64 Action 13 would in such
case require that the joint venture company keeps a
copy of the Master File in its administration, even
though it may contain classified information that the
joint venture partner may not avail of.
• Interpretation of the term ‘products’
Another example is that the Master File should contain
a description of the supply chain for the MNE’s five
largest products or service offerings.65 There is no
explanation as to what the word ‘product’ means. A sim-
ple example. Are the iPhone 6 and the iPhone 7 differ-
ent products? Is an iPhone 7 with 128GB a different
product that the one with 256GB? The guidance gives
MNEs the right to use prudent business judgement in
determining the appropriate level of detail for the infor-
mation supplied, which gives some flexibility. Nonethe-
less, MNEs may be faced with different requirements in
different countries. Where certain countries may only
accept the Master File if choice A is made, other coun-
tries may only accept choice B.
2.4.3 Consequences
(i) Tax structuring
Contribution to identify tax avoidance and aggressive
tax planning
We expect that the documentation requirements of
Action 13 will form a large contribution to the ability of
tax authorities to identify tax avoidance and aggressive
tax planning. With more insight into tax structures, tax
authorities will be able to more efficiently identify and
challenge abuse.
From the Country-by-Country report, tax authorities
will be able to gain insight into the division of profits
between countries, the taxation of these profits and the
ratios that they deem relevant to assess the justification
of the division of profits (see graph on next page).
With the Master File and Local File to complement the
Country-by-Country data, tax authorities will be able to
quickly verify whether the local entities of the MNE
entered into transactions with the ‘suspicious’ jurisdic-
tions.
Conformism: More pressure to act in accordance with
‘expectations’ of tax authorities66
With the knowledge that tax administrations worldwide
will have an insight into the division and taxation of
profits within the MNE, we believe MNEs will be
encouraged to more than ever ensure that its tax struc-
tures are in line not only with all applicable tax legisla-
tion, but also with the expectations of the tax authori-
ties. In addition, MNEs are encouraged to have transfer
pricing documentation available that not only meets the
64. See also OECD, ‘Public comments received Volume III. Discussion Draft
on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting’ (2014), availa-
ble at <www. oecd. org/ ctp/ transfer -pricing/ volume3. pdf> (last visited
at 20 June 2017), at 16.
65. See Action 13 Report, above n. 3, at Annex I.
66. See also para. 3.3.
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bare minimum legal requirements, but that also answers
questions that tax authorities are expected to have when
reviewing the documentation.
Another potential benefit of the increased transparency
is that not only MNEs will be encouraged to improve
their behaviour, also jurisdictions themselves may
change their policy. Countries often coming up as a
‘suspicious’ jurisdiction in Country-by-Country reports
may – under peer pressure – decide to change legislation
to give a better picture in Country-by-Country
reports.67
Conformism: Pressure to work with ‘standard’ struc-
tures
In our experience as tax practitioners, tax authorities are
more likely to challenge tax structures that are not set
up in accordance with ‘standard market practice’. A
transfer pricing system that does not fit within the pic-
ture of how transfer pricing systems generally work
risks being subject to questions of tax authorities. Many
MNEs set up a transfer pricing system with one central
entrepreneur, while the other entities perform ‘routine’
activities (e.g. contract manufacturers and limited risk
distributors). MNEs who do not fit within this ‘tem-
plate’, for example MNEs who give a high level of inde-
pendence to local entities, are more likely to be subject
to questions of tax authorities when presented with their
transfer pricing documentation.68
67. The OECD blacklist lists non-cooperative jurisdictions, and most jurisdic-
tions on the black list have formally enacted regulatory measures. See
for an analysis on the effectiveness of the blacklist D. Masciandaro,
‘Combating Black Money: Money Laundering and Terrorism Finance,
International Cooperation and the G8 Role’ (2004), Economics Working
paper No. 56/26, available at <http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn.
561183> (last visited 20 June 2017), at 3. In addition, the EU Council
agreed on the establishment of an EU list of third country non-coopera-
tive jurisdictions and to explore coordinated defensive measures at EU
level.
68. See e.g. European Commission, above n. 6. In this press release the fol-
lowing was said, which can lead to arbitrary taxation: ‘In fact, the tax
treatment in Ireland enabled Apple to avoid taxation on almost all prof-
its generated by sales of Apple products in the entire EU Single Market.
This is due to Apple’s decision to record all sales in Ireland rather than in
the countries where the products were sold. This structure is however
outside the remit of EU state aid control. If other countries were to
require Apple to pay more tax on profits of the two companies over the
same period under their national taxation rules, this would reduce the
amount to be recovered by Ireland.’
(ii) Tax advisory
Substantial administrative burden and more compliance
work
The expected preference of MNEs to have thorough
transfer pricing documentation combined with the fact
that the legal requirements are far from clear, puts a
substantial administrative burden on MNEs and forces
them to either set up internal specialised transfer pricing
documentation teams or to hire specialised tax advisors
to assist in preparing the transfer pricing documenta-
tion, meaning more compliance work for tax advisers,
and red tape for MNEs.
Accepting ‘incorrect’ audit adjustments
In our observations as tax practitioners, currently many
companies accept ‘incorrect’ audit adjustments as the
risks and costs of challenging the adjustments through
litigation and/or mutual agreement or arbitration pro-
ceedings simply are too high.69 These companies often
don’t seek a corresponding adjustment in other coun-
tries to avoid endangering the consistent application of a
transfer pricing system. If all information is shared
between tax authorities, audit adjustments that deviate
from the transfer pricing system consistently applied by
an MNE might reduce the chances of ‘smooth’ dispute
resolution in other countries.
3 Three Issues the Anti-BEPS
Measures Don’t Address
3.1 The Fundamental Problem of the Current
Corporate Taxation System
Apple’s effective tax rate on the profits realised by its
Irish subsidiary Apple Sales International was allegedly
1% in 2003 and 0.005% in 2014.70 In the UK, Google
paid ‘just’ £6m tax in 2011 on a turnover of £395m.71
69. See e.g. Proposal for a Council Directive of 23 May 2017 on Tax Dis-
pute Resolution Mechanisms in the European Union, 9420/17. Howev-
er, these procedures can still take several years.
70. European Commission, above n. 6.
71. BBC, ‘Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The Rise of Tax Shaming’ (2013),
available at <www. bbc. com/ news/ magazine -20560359> (last visited at
20 June 2017).
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For the public, these numbers at the least raise the ques-
tion how effective the corporation tax system (in
Europe) is. Politicians perceive it as easy to – within one
MNE – shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions – either by
transferring ‘real activities’ (i.e. functions) or merely
ownership of assets and risks – and/or to ‘erode’ the tax
base with deductible royalty or interest payments.72
The question arises is whether the BEPS measures are
the best way to improve fairness in international taxa-
tion. Instead of implementing the BEPS measures, De
Wilde, for instance, advocates a more fundamental
reconsideration of the sustainability of the tax system as
a whole.73 In his recent thesis on the existing model of
international corporate taxation, he states:
The current model of corporate taxation finds its ori-
gins in the 1920s. It well suited the economic realities
of the early days of international trade and com-
merce; the times when international business primar-
ily revolved around bulk trade and bricks-and-mortar
industries. But those days are long gone. Globalisa-
tion, European integration, the rise of multinational
enterprises, e-commerce, and intangible assets have
changed the world considerably.
These developments have caused the model to oper-
ate inconsistently with the economic reality of today.
Corporate taxation and economic reality are no longer
aligned. The model is ill-suited to current market
realities. As a result multinational business decisions
are distorted by tax considerations. The arbitrage
may work to the benefit or detriment of nationally
and internationally active firms. It also seems to put
pressure on nation state corporate tax revenue levels.
This may lead to spill-over effects and welfare losses
at the end of the day. Matters seem to worsen in
today’s increasingly globalizing economy.74
…corporate entities are typically subject to corpora-
tion tax on an individual basis under the separate
entity approach. This approach is generally upheld in
the event that these taxable entities belong to an inte-
grated group. However, in reality multinational
groups of companies do not operate in a segregated
manner. They operate in concert as a functionally
integrated economic entity with a common objective
of profit-optimisation.75
The core problem is that Actions 8-10 maintain the sep-
arate entity approach, in which each entity of an MNE
72. See e.g. C.E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in
Wolves’ Clothing’, in H.J. Aaron et al. (eds.), The Economics of Taxa-
tion (1980) at 327.
73. Alternative systems have been advocated by many and proposals range
from formulary systems to destination based cash flow taxation sys-
tems. See for overviews and assessments De Wilde (2015), above n. 12,
at Chapters 5 and 6.
74. See De Wilde (2015), above n. 12, at Preface.
75. Ibid., at Sec. 1.1.4.3.
is taxed separately, instead of taxing the MNE as a
whole.76
Historically, each legal entity in an MNE generally had
local capabilities for decision-making relevant for that
entity. We see a development of having relevant capabil-
ities for decision-making spread across various locations.
For efficiency reasons, there is trend that not all rele-
vant capabilities to make business decisions are present
in each separate affiliate. Instead, legal entities use capa-
bilities available elsewhere in the group to assist in deci-
sion-making.77 This process is facilitated by a globalis-
ing world that offers flexibility in where people perform
their functions (e.g. videoconference, the cloud, regular
traveling, etc.). For example sales entities don’t need
local experts anymore for functions other than sales (like
accounting, corporate governance, finance, etc.). These
functions are performed at one or more other locations.
As another example, it is often difficult to find qualified
people to form the board. In addition, the ‘responsible
people’ for a specific task within an MNE change rapid-
ly, often also to different countries. The highest ranked
European marketing manager might be located in a dif-
ferent country than his predecessor. As a result, we
more and more see that involvement in decision-making
that binds a legal entity is spread across various coun-
tries.
We see that an MNE is often artificially dividend into
individual entities to meet local law requirements.
Therefore, taxing legal entities instead of MNEs does
no longer fit within current business reality.
Actions 8-10 do not address the fundamental problems
underlying the tax system, but instead try to ‘fix’ alleged
abuses that are caused by the system, by proposing ‘sol-
utions’ that still don’t fit within the reality of the current
international business practice.
“Basically all tax jurisdictions attempt to geographically
localise business activities and the business income produced.
The purpose is to ensure that business income generated
within the territory of the taxing state is taxed by that
state.”78 As noted above, the political perception is that
taxation of multinational enterprises is not aligned with
the economic activity that produces their profits (i.e. not
aligned with ‘value creation’). The perception is that
value creation is for the main part attributable to sales
and to employees. Actions 8-10 and Action 7 try to
address this issue.79 Actions 8-10 seem to claim that
under the arm’s length principle, functions (i.e. employ-
ees) determine where profits should be allocated. Action
7 tries to align taxation with sales by creating taxable
presence of foreign legal entities in the country where
the sales (or other decisions) are made.
76. See for a comparison M. Kobetsky, ‘The Case for Unitary Taxation of
International Enterprises’, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 201
(2008). Kobetsky argues essentially that taxing highly integrated inter-
national enterprises (e.g. banks) on a unitary basis is appropriate
because these businesses operate on a unitary basis.
77. See for a comparison K. Sadiq, ‘Unitary Taxation: The Case for Global
Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for International Taxation no. 7
(2001), at 275-86.
78. De Wilde (2015), above n. 12, at 164.
79. See Action Report 7, above n. 3, and Action Reports 8-10, above n. 3.
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But value creation is not necessarily attributable to sales
and employees. Empirical research even shows that
labour should play little if any role in allocating taxing
rights; any causality link between labour costs and prof-
it-making seems absent.80 Identifying where value is
generated is a fundamental problem of conventional cor-
poration taxes in an international setting.81 Value crea-
tion is an economic question, the result of supply and
demand in the market. Economics is the study of how
people choose to allocate their scarce resources.82 The
price for each resource that contributes to the profit is
determined by demand and supply.83 Capital and IP
might be scarce resources ‘creating value’.84 In addition
to looking at this ‘supply side’ of profit generation, the
demand side (revenue) should be considered.85
By maintaining the traditional transfer pricing question
of which economic activities create which profits, the
OECD continues supporting substantial profit attribu-
tion to mobile production factors such as capital and IP,
which can relatively easily be shifted legally to tax
friendly locations. If the OECD wanted to tax profits
based on sales and employees, it should step away from
the traditional transfer pricing question of which eco-
nomic activities create which profits, and instead impose
a tax based on the factors sales and employees.
3.2 Corporation Tax Is among the Most
Distorting Taxes
At the time that MNEs paid low taxes in the countries
where their products were sold (for high prices), citizens
faced economic recession and governments faced high
deficits after the economic crisis that started in 2008.86
In this light it is understandable that governments may
be attracted to tax corporate profits. Voters generally
perceive such taxes as being borne by companies or their
wealthy owners and see it as a ‘justified’ way to increase
tax revenues without hurting the public. With the pub-
lic opinion on tax avoidance in mind, it was a small step
for governments to try to increase tax revenue by com-
batting BEPS.
However, the tendency towards levying corporation tax
might be unjustified. As noted by the Mirrlees review in
2011, ‘perhaps the most important point to keep in
mind when considering company taxation is that it is
not meaningful to think about the effects of taxes on
companies separately from the effects of those taxes on
the individuals associated with companies’ (such as the
80. J.R. Hines Jr., ‘Income Misattribution under Formula Apportionment’,
54 European Economic Review 108 (2010).
81. M.P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic
Principles and Tax Policy Considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy 698 (2008), at 25.
82. W.J. Wessels, Economics (2000), at 2.
83. Musgrave, above n. 7.
84. M. Markham, The Transfer Pricing of Intangibles (2005).
85. See for a comparison Musgrave, above n. 7, at 228-46.
86. For in-depth analyses of developments in the build-up period to the
launch of the BEPS initiative by G20 and OECD see R.S. Avi-Yonah,
‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State’, 113 Harvard Law Review 1573 (2000), at 1573-1676.
owners, employees, customers, etc.).87 Imposing a tax
that is statutory borne by companies does not automati-
cally mean that the economic burden of such tax is also
borne by those companies (or its shareholders).88
Through product pricing and wages, it could very well
be borne by the customers or employees of the compa-
ny.
Who eventually bears the ‘effective incidence’ of a cor-
poration tax is difficult, if not impossible, to predict. It
depends on ‘the form of the corporate tax, the nature of
the economy in which it is levied, and the choices open
to the firms on which it is imposed’.89 But some direc-
tion can be given, it seems at least. Recent empirical
studies have demonstrated that an increase of corpora-
tion tax is to a large extent borne by the workforce
through lower wages.90
In addition, corporation taxes are considered to be
among the most distorting taxes.91 Taken into account
this observation and the expectation that corporation
taxes are in the end to a large extent borne by the work-
force, it could very well be that employees would be bet-
ter off if their wages or expenses would be taxed direct-
ly.92
3.3 The Responsibility of Paying a ‘Fair Share’
In international taxation, the responsibility to determine
which country may tax which profits when MNEs do
business in more than one country is laid in the hands of
MNEs. This has been done by continuing with the
arm’s length principle (Article 9 of the OECD Model
Convention). Any alternative would increase the risk of
double taxation or would require an alternative alloca-
tion system. Apparently, early in the BEPS discussions
the participating countries have not been able to agree
on how to divide income from taxation on worldwide
profits themselves in an alternative way, for example by
treating an MNE as one taxpayer that pays taxes on its
worldwide income in one country.93 This country then
divides the tax income between all countries in which
the MNE is active. Such a solution requires internation-
al tax coordination of an unprecedented level, and a
willingness of countries to give up their sovereignty in
87. J. Mirrlees et al., ‘Tax by Design’ (2011), available at <www. ifs. org. uk/
publications/ 5353> (last visited 20 June 2017) at 408.
88. See W. Vermeend et al., Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the
Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, Investment, Consumption
and the Environment (2008), at 41 and 156.
89. Ibid., at 409.
90. W. Arulampalam, M. Devereux & G. Maffini, ‘The Direct Incidence of
Corporate Income Taxes on Wages’ (2012), 56 European Economic
Review 6, at 1038-54.
91. OECD, 2008, Taxation and Economic Growth.
92. J. Mirrlees et al., above n. 87, at 411.
93. Worth noting is that this meets the observations of the US state tax
authorities close to a century ago: ‘there is no right rule of apportion-
ment (…) the only right rule (…) is a rule on which the several states
can and will get together as a matter of comity’. See C.S. Lamb et al.,
‘Report of Committee on the Apportionment between States of Taxes
on Mercantile and Manufacturing Business’ (1922), 15 National Tax
Association, 198-212, at 202.
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taxation (like the CCCTB).94 More importantly, this
requires countries to make a division of profits with
which they all agree. Countries have not been able to
come to such an agreement and made MNEs responsi-
ble to divide profits between countries. May it be expec-
ted from an MNE that it divides profits in such a way
that all countries are ‘happy’ with their share?95
The responsibility to divide profits gives MNEs the
freedom to arrange their transfer pricing in such a way
that total taxation is lowest, while they still comply with
local legislation in each country. The question arises
whether – besides a legal obligation to pay tax – there is
also a ‘moral obligation’ to pay tax if the law allows to
reduce taxation to a minimum. In this regard, the obser-
vation of the US Judge Learned Hand is famous:
Anyone may arrange his affairs so that his taxes shall
be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which best pays the treasury. There is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.96 Over
and over again the Courts have said that there is
nothing sinister in so arranging affairs as to keep tax-
es as low as possible. Everyone does it, rich and poor
alike and all do right, for nobody owes any public
duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are
enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To
demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.97
94. On 25 October 2016, as part of a broader package of corporate tax
reforms (see European Commission, ‘Corporate Tax Reform Package’
(2016), available at <https:// ec. europa. eu/ taxation_ customs/ business/
company -tax/ corporate -tax -reform -package_ en_ en> (last visited 20
June 2017)), the European Commission released proposals for a so-
called CC(C)TB, relaunching its original CCCTB proposal of 16 March
2011 in two stages, essentially with a view to introducing unitary taxa-
tion and formulary apportionment in the internal market; see Proposal
for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) of 25
October 2016, 2016/0337; Proposal for a Council Directive on a Com-
mon Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) of 25 October 2016,
2016/0336; and see Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) of 16 March 2011,
2011/0058.
95. The Commission proposals for introducing a CCCTB for instance have
already met some fierce resistance by a number of EU Member States
and some have raised formal objections against the proposals; see for
an overview EUR, ‘Procedure 2016/0336/CNNS’ (2016), available at
<http:// eur -lex. europa. eu/ legal -content/ ENG/ HIS/ ?uri= COM: 2016:
683: FIN for an overview> (last visited 20 June 2017).
96. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Helvering v. Gregory, 69
F.2d 809 (1934).
97. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848 (1947).
Following this conclusion, countries cannot rely on the
moral duty of MNEs to pay more tax than required by
law. In our view, MNEs may voluntarily pay more taxes
than law requires, but may also take on a different atti-
tude. The attitudes towards taxation can be distinguish-
ed as in the table above.98
In view of the observation of the US Judge Learned
Hand stated above,99 MNEs may in our view choose any
attitude with a minimum of legalism. In our observa-
tions as tax practitioners, we see a shift from legalism to
conformism. Legalism and to a lesser extent conform-
ism allow for tax optimisation. If countries do not want
to run the risk that certain profits remain low taxed,
they should divide the profits themselves. With the
choice of making tax payers responsible for dividing
profits, countries shifted the risk of double taxation to
tax payers, but also the risk of double non-taxation. For
the future of tax advisory, we see an important role for
tax advisers to create awareness of the potential attitudes
and to match the tax advice that is given to clients to the
selected attitude. The role of tax advisory shifts from
advising MNEs on the lowest possible effective tax rate
to a broader advise including risks, risk appetite and
public expectations.
4 Conclusions
Politics perceives taxation of MNEs as not aligned with
the economic activity that produces their profits (i.e. not
aligned with ‘value creation’). In this perception, value
creation is for the main part attributable to sales and to
employees. But value creation is not necessarily attribut-
able to sales and employees. Value creation is an eco-
nomic question, the result of supply and demand in the
market. In BEPS Actions 8-10, the OECD maintains
the traditional transfer pricing question of which eco-
nomic activities create which profits. Thereby, the
OECD keeps the risk alive that substantial profits are
attributable to mobile scarce production factors such as
capital, which can relatively easily be shifted to tax
friendly locations. If the OECD wanted to tax profits
98. Derived from VNO-NCW and MKB-Nederland, Leiderschap in ethiek,
Inspiratie voor een baanbrekende ethiek voor bedrijven (2016), at 11,
and further applied in the field of taxation by T. Bender, ‘Tussen ethiek
en wet: een derde weg’, Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 20 (2017).
99. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, above n. 96.
Orientation Source Considerations Central question
Egoism Own interest Profits What helps me most?
Legalism Law and rules Fines, court cases What does the law require?
Conformism Expectations of others Reputation, acceptation What do other expect from?
Ethical Balanced interest Conscious and general
interest
What is best for all stakeholders?
Altruism Interest of others Sacrifice What helps others most?
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based on sales and employees, it should step away from
the traditional transfer pricing question of which eco-
nomic activities create which profits, and instead impose
a tax based on factors that are less mobile (e.g. sales and
employees). As the proposed solution is not fully
aligned with the underlying intentions of politicians,
many uncertainties arise.
How will this impact tax structuring and tax advisory?
We expect the following consequences:
– Actions 8-10 combat existing tax planning opportuni-
ties for MNEs, but does so in a way that it creates
more disputes with tax authorities, a shift of func-
tions away from high tax countries, a diminishing
value of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and
new tax planning opportunities. As such, Actions
8-10 may not be the best way to reduce ‘aggressive
tax planning’.
– Tax planning will focus more on tax beneficial struc-
tures in which the business set-up runs parallel with
the tax structure. We expect the use of empty cash
boxes (e.g. intellectual property (IP) companies) to
reduce, knowing that tax authorities will challenge
such structures. The IP will be relocated to locations
with the relevant substance to manage the IP, while
the arm’s length principle, notwithstanding the
changes of Actions 8-10, is expected to leave suffi-
cient opportunities to keep the tax benefits.
– Tax advisers need to take a more critical role towards
positions taken by tax authorities and not automati-
cally accept their positions as the ‘truth’. Some tax
authorities will be tempted to argue that more profits
should be allocated to them provoked by the ambigu-
ous guidance on how associated enterprises should
price their transactions We fear that this will lead to
more ‘aggressive tax collection’ by tax administra-
tions.
– For the future of tax advisory, we see an important
role for tax advisers to create awareness of the poten-
tial attitudes of clients towards tax structuring and to
match the tax advice that is given with the selected
attitude. The role of tax advisory shift from advising
MNEs on the lowest possible effective tax rate to a
broader advise including risks, risk appetite and pub-
lic expectations.
– MNEs will avoid discussions with tax authorities by
proactively claiming taxable presence in a country. In
our observations as tax practitioners, from a tax per-
spective MNEs will prefer working with one legal
entity with permanent establishments in each country
where it formerly operated through a legal entity,
even though there are business reasons to use sepa-
rate entities. This reduces discussions about the pres-
ence of PEs of various legal entities, and reduces the
taxable presence in each country to one legal entity.
– Action 13 will contribute to identify tax avoidance
and aggressive tax planning, it will put more pressure
to act in accordance with ‘expectations’ of tax author-
ities and to work with ‘standard’ structures, it will
create a substantial administrative burden and more
compliance work, and in our observations as tax prac-
titioners, it will tempt MNEs to accept ‘incorrect’
audit adjustments to avoid having to deviate from a
consistently applied transfer pricing system.
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